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*By Bibi González. 
Migration is a fundamental aspect of international political economy (IPE). It 
encompasses every aspect of the field of study but has been distanced from IPE 
mainstream. Nonetheless, it is an international phenomenon that requires joint 
participation and negotiation between the sending and receiving countries to 
determine their policies. Migration generates interdependence from below, 
where micro-structures are initiated by the people. States, politic, economic and 
social aspects are inherently touched by people’s mobility. In this article we will 
highlight the impact that remittances have on the home country, and how 
dependent Guatemala is on fluctuations of the host country. It will explore how 
remittances shape Guatemala’s economy. 
This article will follow three main questions: Why do people migrate from 
Guatemala to the United States? How does emigration impact Guatemala 
economically and socially? What are the challenges the Guatemalan government 
faces and needs to overcome to move forward from an ever growing dependency 
on emigration? It will be argued that remittances generate a greater dependency 
to the US. Remittances represent one of the main incomes in Guatemala. Not 
only are they bound to the receiving country’s volatility (e.g. economic crisis and 
immigration law), they are not sustainable in the long term. But 
underdeveloped countries have yet to realise this in their policies, as 
remittances feature as a cushion to the balance of payment and emigration a 
relief to unemployment rates. Nevertheless, it is an issue that has to be targeted 
immediately. Furthermore, it is argued that social networks are the cornerstone 
of migration. The social impact on determinants of out-migration, diaspora and 
return are all intertwined within security issues, where American originated 
gangs return to their home countries, exporting criminal behaviour (known as 
the cost of social remittances). (1) Maras in conjunction with organised crime 
are new actors in determinants of emigration. This vicious circle revolves not 
only around IPE but becomes an international security issue. The state must act 
now for it to avoid its own erosion and cataclysm in the long term, taking down 
its credibility, economy and security. 
Heated debates come afloat between international migration and economic 
development. On one hand, there is the assumption that economic development 
will enhance emigration and others who argue the opposite. This article will 
favour the latter argument that development will improve conditions for 
potential migrants to stay home. Since Guatemala’s emigration came basically 
from political instability and insecurity, an important variable is the current 
economic and security situation. Internal migration and refugee movements 
initiated during the civil war and terror repression, were it is estimated that over 
200,000 people were killed or disappeared. A politically generated migration 
mobilised and displaced 1.5 million people between 1981 and 1983. (2) Most 
people fled to neighbouring countries as refugees and asylum seekers. This 
migration tendency was eased once democracy returned and peace accords 
signed in 1996. There are currently 1.4 million Guatemalan migrants in the US, 
of which more than half are undocumented. Violence in Guatemala has not 
ceased and therefore maras or gangs, corruption and insecurity are current out-
migration push factors. Development should include not only economic 
development (higher GDP), but should be complemented with social 
development that pursues poverty alleviation, education, and security. 
Remittances have captured most of the attention concerning migration. Worker 
remittances are defined as ‘the quantity of currency that migrants earn abroad 
and then send home to their families and communities’. (3) They are a source of 
foreign (hard) currency and can be used towards consumption, savings, 
investment, affecting both the household’s and the country’s economy. Globally, 
remittances to middle and low income countries in 1990 amounted to US$ 31 
billion; in 2006 the amount increased to US$ 200 billion. (4) One fourth was 
sent to Latin America of which US$ 52 billion were sent back and can be 
compared to foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development 
assistance (ODA) flows. 
A growing concern in Latin America refers to remittances vis-à-vis GDP. Mexico 
is the first recipient of remittances in Latin America (net billion and in 2005 
represented 45% of recipient of remittances). In Guatemala, remittances 
constitute one of the highest sources of household income and represent a large 
percentage of the country’s GDP (11,3%) compared to the less than 5% in 
Mexico. Given the importance of economic migrants sending money home, any 
fluctuation or variation in the receiving country will make the sending countries 
even more vulnerable and dependant than what they already are. Latin 
American countries face a big challenge: create more employment possibilities 
at home and persuade potential migrants to stay, or ignore and continue, in 
their best interest, encouraging emigration to ease unemployment rates and 
gain from remittances. Until now, remittances have been a consistent income 
for developing countries. They constitute a positive aspect of emigration. 
However, in the long run, a country cannot rely on ‘comfortable’ income from 
emigrants dissatisfied by their government’s instability and incapacity to create 
jobs, and wage differential. The free ride is bound to end, and attention has to 
be paid before it is too late. (5) 
 
  
 
Guatemala has become excessively reliant on remittances. The main setback is 
that they are not sustainable in a long term. If the trend continues, further 
emigration will stimulate depopulation of the home country. Consequently, 
economic development through GDP is not the long term answer to fight off 
dependence on remittances. On the other hand, social and human development 
needs to be fostered and invest in education, healthcare, poverty reduction and 
security. 
The latter issue has given migration a new twist. It represents another major 
issue to governments to tackle urgently, and a determinant of further 
emigration due to the growing violence in the territory, just as civil war times in 
Guatemala. International organised crime and migration has to seek state 
intervention and international cooperation. If migration and security are not 
managed wisely, Guatemala can expect a downward spiral and meltdown in the 
long term. 
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